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Abstract 
According to the fitting-attitudes account of value, for X to be good is for it to be 
fitting to value X. But what is it for an attitude to be fitting? A popular recent 
view is that it is for there to be sufficient reason for the attitude. In this paper we 
argue that proponents of the fitting-attitudes account should reject this view and 
instead take fittingness as basic. In this way they avoid the notorious ‘wrong kind 
of reason’ problem, and can offer attractive accounts of reasons and good 
reasoning in terms of fittingness. 
 
According to the fitting-attitudes account of value, what it is for X to be good is for it to be 
fitting to value X. Famously proposed by Brentano and Ewing, the fitting-attitudes account 
takes goodness to be similar to properties like that of being admirable, fearful, or amusing.1 
These properties are plausibly understood as a matter of the fittingness or appropriateness of 
a certain human response: admiration, fear, or amusement. Similarly, on the fitting-attitudes 
view, goodness, or being valuable, is a matter of the fittingness of the response of valuing. 
 The fitting-attitudes account is often thought to constitute an attractive middle-ground 
between subjectivist views on which something is good just if we value it and Moorean views 
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on which goodness is a basic, non-natural – and, so critics say, mysterious – property. And 
while the advantages of the fitting-attitudes account over Moorean views should not be 
overstated – the metaphysical questions that arise about Moorean goodness seem also to arise 
about fittingness – the connection between value and human valuing responses does seem an 
attractive feature of the fitting-attitudes account. 
 Nonetheless, and even putting aside the question of whether fittingness is a ‘non-
natural’ property, there is an important question about how fittingness is to be understood. A 
popular recent suggestion is that fittingness should be understood in terms of reasons – 
roughly, that what it is for it to be fitting to value X is for there to be sufficient reason to 
value X. This idea is especially natural for those sympathetic to the recently influential 
reasons-first approach to normativity. On this approach, reasons are the basic normative unit, 
and the rest of the normative and evaluative domain can be understood in terms of reasons.2 
If we put this view together with the fitting-attitudes account, we reach the buck-passing 
account of value: what it is for X to be good is for there to be sufficient reason to value X.  
 The aim of this paper is to argue that proponents of the fitting-attitudes account 
should not take this path. Instead, they should take fittingness as basic. Doing so results in a 
view which has all the attractions of the buck-passing view, and more, but avoids a serious 
problem facing the buck-passer. In making this case, we also show how reasons (and thus 
oughts) can be understood in terms of fittingness. The paper thus makes an initial case for 
taking fittingness first: for seeing fittingness as the basic normative property from which the 
rest of the normative and evaluative domain is constructed. 
 The buck-passing view is sometimes understood as an attempt at conceptual analysis. 
However, we will understand it as a metaphysical account of the property of goodness: an 
account of what it is for something to be good.3 Similarly, our fittingness-first view says that 
fittingness is metaphysically first, not that it is conceptually or epistemically prior to 
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goodness or reasons. Note also that our claim is that fittingness is first relative to the rest of 
the normative and evaluative domain. This leaves open the possibility – about which we are 
neutral – that fittingness may in turn be reducible to the natural or descriptive.  
One might ask why we should expect that either reasons or fittingness comes ‘first’. 
Why expect that there will be some basic normative or evaluative property from which the 
rest of the normative and evaluative domain is constructed? We do not assume from the 
outset that this is so.4 However, we take it that this hypothesis has significant attractions. In 
general, accounts of a property F in terms of another property G promise straightforward 
explanations of features of F and of connections between F and G. We will discuss several 
examples of this in what follows. And since the normative and evaluative domain seems 
highly interconnected, the hypothesis that there is one basic normative property has 
significant explanatory promise. Whether this hypothesis can ultimately be sustained is a 
question this paper aims to contribute towards answering.  
 The paper has three main sections. The first sets out the central attractions of the 
buck-passing account and the central problem with it. The second outlines our alternative 
fittingness-first view and explains how this view retains the attractions of the buck-passing 
view while avoiding the problem. The third section considers objections to our view. 
 
1. The Buck-Passing Account of Value 
 
According to the buck-passing account of value: 
 
What it is for X to be good is for there to be sufficient reason for anyone to value X.5 
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‘Value’ is used here as a cover-term for a variety of pro-responses. Examples of such 
responses include desire, choice, wish, taking pleasure in, and being glad that. ‘Good’ refers 
to goodness simpliciter. Goodness simpliciter should be distinguished from goodness-for (as 
something might be good for one’s health, or for trees, or for an engine) and from attributive-
goodness (as in good toasters, good holiday destinations, and good assassins). The buck-
passing account is thus that for something (a state of affairs, or perhaps a process or event) to 
be good simpliciter is for anyone to have sufficient reason to have some pro-response towards 
that thing. We take the buck-passing account, so understood, to have at least three central 
attractions. 
 
1.1. Demystifying Goodness Simpliciter 
 
The first attraction of the buck-passing account is that it helps to demystify the notion of 
goodness simpliciter. Several philosophers, including Peter Geach, Philippa Foot, and Judith 
Thomson, have argued that no sense can be made of this notion.6 They insist that talk of 
goodness is always talk about goodness-for or attributive-goodness. Here is a representative 
passage from Thomson: 
 
[A]ll goodness is goodness in a way…if we do not know in what way a man means 
that a thing is good when he says of it ‘That’s good’, then we simply do not know 
what he is saying of it. Perhaps he means that it is good to eat, or that it is good for 
use in making cheesecake, or that it is good for Alfred. If he tells us, “No, no, I meant 
that it is just plain a good thing,” then we can at best suppose he is a philosopher 
making a joke.7 
 
5 
 
Geach, Foot, and Thomson each take the claim that there is no such thing as goodness 
simpliciter to have deep implications for moral philosophy. Most notably, they take it to show 
that the consequentialist claim that we ought to maximize (final) goodness simpliciter is a 
non-starter. 
 The buck-passing account offers a straightforward answer to this worry.8 On the 
buck-passing account, being (finally) good simpliciter just is being what there is sufficient 
reason to value for its own sake. Geach, Foot, and Thomson do not claim to doubt that talk of 
reasons or of valuing something for its own sake makes sense. And nor should they: it seems 
plain that some of us do value happiness for its own sake, for example, and it is intelligible to 
claim that there is sufficient reason to do so. 
 
1.2. Generalising the Account: Specific Values, Good-For, Attributive Good 
 
The second central attraction of the buck-passing account is that it promises to generalise in 
an attractive way. As we have explained, the buck-passing account is in the first instance an 
account of goodness simpliciter. However, as we have seen, there are a range of other value 
properties, such as goodness-for, attributive goodness, and more specific value properties, 
such as the admirable and amusing. Since it would be surprising if there was no interesting 
relation between goodness simpliciter and these properties, a promising account of the former 
should be expected to generalise to these other kinds of value properties, and to illuminate the 
similarities and differences between them. 
 The buck-passing account is well-placed to do this. It is easily adapted to offer 
accounts of specific value properties. The buck-passer can say that something is, for example, 
admirable if there is sufficient reason to admire it. There are also prospects for generalizing 
the account to goodness-for and the varieties of attributive goodness. For instance, perhaps Y 
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is good for X if there is sufficient reason for anyone who has reason to care about X to value 
Y, because they have reason to care about X. And perhaps Y is a good X if there is sufficient 
reason for anyone who has reason to want an X to value Y, because they have reason to want 
an X.9 
 These suggestions are rough, but they are enough to indicate that there are serious 
prospects of developing the buck-passing account so as to generalise to the other value 
properties and to illuminate the similarities and differences between them. 
 
1.3. Reasons and Value 
 
The third central attraction of the buck-passing account is that it offers straightforward 
explanations of the various connections between reasons and value. We shall give two 
examples. 
 First, the buck-passing account explains what one of us has elsewhere called the 
linking principle.10 To a first approximation, it seems to be true that: 
 
If some consideration is a respect in which X is good, then that consideration is a 
reason to value X. 
 
For example, if another drink would be good insofar as it would bring you pleasure, then the 
fact that it would bring pleasure is a reason to want another drink; if travel is good insofar as 
it broadens the mind, then that fact that travel broadens the mind is a reason to want to travel. 
 The linking principle requires explanation – it is surely not a coincidence that reasons 
to value and goodness are connected in such a systematic way. The buck-passing account 
offers a simple explanation of the principle. If for something to be good is for there to be 
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reasons to value it, then it is plausible that for something to be good in some respect is for 
that respect to be a reason to value it. The linking principle thus follows directly from the 
nature of value. 
 Second, T.M. Scanlon famously observes that the fact that something is good is not an 
additional reason to value that thing, over and above the non-evaluative facts which are 
reasons to value that thing. For example, the fact that a scientific discovery is good does not 
seem to be an additional reason to applaud that discovery, over and above the non-evaluative 
facts which make the discovery good – for instance, that it sheds light on the causes of 
cancer.11 In fact, Scanlon suggests that the goodness of the discovery does not give a reason 
to applaud it at all. Arguably, this is too strong. However, if the goodness of the discovery is 
a reason to applaud it, it is not an additional reason in the sense of being a reason which adds 
any weight to the non-evaluative reasons for applauding the discovery.12 
 Again, this observation is straightforwardly explained by the buck-passing account. 
The goodness of the discovery adds no additional reason to applaud the discovery because the 
discovery’s goodness simply consists in the presence of reasons to applaud it. Thus, it does 
not add weight to these reasons, even if it is itself a reason. 
 
1.4. The Wrong Kind of Reason Problem 
 
While there is more to say on all these issues, it seems clear that the buck-passing view has 
some significant prima facie attractions. However, it also faces a very serious problem. 
Suppose, to give a now well-worn example, that an evil demon threatens to destroy the world 
unless everyone values him. The demon’s threat seems to give everyone sufficient reason to 
value him – after all, otherwise the world will be destroyed! But the demon’s threat does not 
make him good. The buck-passing account thus seems open to simple counter-examples.13 
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 Buck-passers have offered two main sorts of response to this problem. The first 
response is to reject the apparent counter-examples. Buck-passers who take this line insist 
that the demon’s threat is not a reason to value him. Instead, the threat is merely a reason to 
want to admire the demon, and perhaps to bring it about that you admire him. On this view, 
the incentive to admire the demon is like an incentive for having a headache. Such incentives 
can give you reason to want a headache, and to bring one about, but they do not, strictly 
speaking, give you reasons for a headache.14 
 The second response is to draw a distinction between two kinds of reasons to value. 
The right kind of reasons to value are considerations which are both reasons to value an 
object and features that make it good. The wrong kind of reasons are considerations which 
are reasons to value an object but not features that make it good. If a distinction of this sort 
can be drawn then buck-passers can reformulate their view. They can say that for something 
to be good is for there to be sufficient right kind reason to value it. 
 Both responses face serious difficulties. The worry about the latter strategy is simple. 
The most obvious way to draw the distinction between the right and the wrong kind of 
reasons is in terms of goodness, as above. But, on pain of circularity, the buck-passer cannot 
draw the distinction in this way. And while several philosophers have now tried to offer non-
circular accounts of what makes something a reason of the right kind, it is fair to say that 
none have been widely accepted. All such accounts seem either to give rise to clear counter-
examples or to turn out, on inspection, to rely on the notion of value which the buck-passing 
account is intended to elucidate. Furthermore, even if the buck-passer can distinguish the 
right and the wrong kind of reasons in a way that avoids counter-examples, the literature to 
this point suggests that any such distinction is going to be complicated. This will make the 
buck-passer’s view correspondingly less attractive.15 
9 
 
 The former strategy is also difficult to defend. As is often pointed out, many find the 
claim that incentives provide reasons for attitudes clearly true.16 Proponents of the second 
strategy thus need to both argue that incentives are not reasons and explain why not. The 
second of these tasks is particularly challenging.17 Buck-passers typically accept the reasons-
first approach, on which reasons are the basic normative unit.18 And many accept the further 
claim that reasons are absolutely basic: that we can give no informative account of what it is 
for something to be a reason. At most, we can paraphrase: thus Scanlon and Parfit say that 
reasons are considerations which count in favour (or against) a response. These buck-passers 
have very few resources available to explain why incentives for attitudes are not reasons for 
those attitudes – since their account of what reasons are is so thin, nothing in it seems to rule 
this out.19 For example, suppose that the buck-passer claims that incentives for attitudes are 
not reasons for attitudes because they fail a response-condition, according to which a reason 
to A must be the sort of thing for which you could A.20 Even if it could be shown that 
incentives for attitudes failed this condition, buck-passers are not well placed to endorse the 
response condition. For, if such a condition holds, either it is a brute truth about reasons, or 
there is some explanation of why it holds. It would be a serious cost for any view to posit the 
response condition as a brute truth. It is a very strong condition; if true, it cries out for 
explanation. Suppose, then, that there is an explanation of why this condition holds. The 
obvious candidate is that it holds because of the nature of reasons. But, if reasons are 
absolutely basic, it is hard to see how anything about their nature could explain the response 
condition.21 Nor does Scanlon and Parfit’s paraphrase help. If anything is clear, it is that the 
fact that the demon will destroy the world unless everyone values him counts in favour of 
valuing the demon. Counting in favour is not subject to a response condition. 
  Similar considerations apply to other conditions on reasons that might be invoked 
here, for example (to anticipate) that reasons must correspond to good reasoning.  
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 We do not want to say that neither of the strategies outlined can succeed, or that the 
wrong kind of reason problem thus refutes the buck-passing view. Nonetheless, these worries 
seem serious enough to motivate the consideration of an alternative, non-buck-passing, 
version of the fitting-attitudes view. In the next section, we outline such a view. 
   
2. Fittingness First 
 
2.1 Fitting-Attitudes Without Buck-Passing 
 
The fitting-attitudes account of value as such does not face the wrong kind of reason problem. 
Recall that the fitting-attitudes account says that 
 
 What it is for X to be good is for it to be fitting to value X. 
 
The demon’s threat to destroy the world unless everyone values him might give everyone a 
reason to value him, but it does not make it fitting to value him – it does not make him fit to 
be valued. This judgment is widely shared in the literature and we take it to be intuitively 
clear.22 Note that it can equally be expressed in other ways. For instance, one might also say 
that it is not correct to value the demon, that one would not be getting it right in valuing him, 
or that the demon is not worthy of valuing, or an appropriate object of valuing. These 
expressions can all be used to express the notion of fittingness. 
 Why isn’t it fitting to value the demon? Strictly speaking, all that matters for our 
purposes at this point is that it is not fitting. However, it may be helpful to say something 
about this, in order to make sure we have satisfactorily individuated the property of 
fittingness (we will say more about it later). Take a specific valuing attitude, such as 
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admiration. This attitude sets a standard for objects. The standard specifies certain features, 
having enough (or an appropriate weighted sum) of which makes an object fit to admire—
that is, admirable. For example, features like humility and concern for others may be on the 
list for admiration. The demon is notably lacking in these sorts of features. Thus, it is not 
fitting to admire him. 
 The idea of attitudes’ having internal standards of fittingness or correctness is a 
familiar one. The most obvious example is belief. Whatever is the best interpretation of the 
slogan that belief ‘aims at truth’, this much is plausible: it is in the nature of the attitude of 
belief to be assessable as correct or incorrect, according to the truth or falsity of the 
proposition believed.23 The attitude of belief thus sets truth as its standard of correctness. We 
take correctness for belief to be an instance of the broader property of fittingness.24 
 So, the fitting-attitudes account alone does not entail that the demon is good. It does 
so only when supplemented with the account of fittingness in terms of reasons—the step that 
turns the fitting-attitudes account into a buck-passing account. Perhaps, then, the defender of 
the fitting-attitudes account should eschew buck-passing. But we also saw that buck-passing 
has many attractions. Is the fitting-attitudes account alone equally attractive? 
 The first such attraction was the demystification of goodness simpliciter. The fitting-
attitudes account alone seems sufficient to secure this result. On this approach, goodness 
simpliciter is understood in terms of what is fitting to value. There doesn’t seem to be any 
particular difficulty in making sense of talk of what is fitting to value. 
The second attraction of buck-passing was that it promised to generalise to other 
value properties, besides goodness simpliciter. The fitting-attitudes account alone does this 
just as easily. Instead of saying that something is admirable if there is sufficient reason to 
admire it, we say simply that something is admirable if it is fitting to admire it. Likewise for 
other specific values. We can distinguish goodness simpliciter, goodness-for, and attributive 
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goodness in much the same way as the buck-passer does. For X to be good simpliciter, we 
can say, is for it to be fitting for anyone to value X. For Y to be good for X is for it to be 
fitting for anyone for whom it is fitting to care about X to value Y, because it is fitting for 
them to care about X. And for Y to be a good X is for it to be fitting for anyone for whom it 
is fitting to want an X to value Y, because it is fitting for them to want an X. These 
formulations are rough, but they seem enough to show that the fittingness-first view is in just 
as good a position as buck-passing when it comes to accounting for these value properties. 
 The third attraction was the explanation of connections between reasons and value. 
Here, the fitting-attitudes account alone does not suffice. That’s because it has nothing to say 
about reasons. But perhaps it can explain these connections when supplemented by a 
plausible account of reasons. We explore this possibility in the next section.  
 
2.2 The Fittingness-First Account of Reasons 
 
How would a suitable account of reasons go? Since we are trying to explain connections 
between value and reasons, and the fitting-attitudes account understands value in terms of the 
fittingness of a certain kind of response, it seems sensible to try to understand reasons in 
terms of fittingness as well.25 Some ways of doing this are suggested by views that are 
already in the literature. For example: 
 
For that p to be a reason for a response is for that p to be evidence that that response is 
fitting. 
 
Or: 
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For that p to be a reason for a response is for that p to help explain why that response 
is fitting.26 
  
However, both of these accounts are subject to forceful objections, parallel to those facing the 
more familiar claims that reasons are evidence, or explanations, of what you ought to do.27 
We propose instead an account of a sort already defended by one of us elsewhere.28 
As a first step towards this account, note that there seems to be an important 
connection between reasons and reasoning. Reasons, we might say, are for reasoning; they 
are the sort of thing it is suitable to reason with. This suggests that it might be possible to 
understand reasons as premises of good reasoning.  Here is a way to make this idea more 
precise (we will modify this slightly later on): 
 
For that p to be a reason for a response is for that p to be a premise of a good pattern 
of reasoning from fitting responses to that response. 
 
To illustrate: that the lights are on is a reason to believe that somebody is home, because there 
is a good pattern of reasoning with this consideration as a premise, that concludes in the 
belief that somebody is home; that you promised to meet your friend is a reason to intend to 
do so, because there is a good pattern of reasoning with this consideration as a premise, that 
concludes in the intention to meet your friend. 
 Here, reasoning is understood broadly, as a certain kind of transition in which a set of 
responses, which we can call premise-responses, leads to some (further) response, which we 
can call the conclusion-response. This transition is such that the conclusion-response counts 
as based on, or held in the light of, the premise-responses. The sorts of things that count as 
responses include, notably, attitudes. For example, theoretical reasoning might involve a 
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transition from a set of beliefs to a belief. Practical reasoning might involve a transition from 
a belief and a pro-attitude to some further pro-attitude, to an intention, or, perhaps, to an 
action. 
 That p is a premise of a pattern of reasoning when the belief that p, or some other 
appropriate representation of the consideration that p, is among the premise-responses of that 
pattern of reasoning.29 
 When we say that reasons are premises of good reasoning, we do not mean that 
anyone must actually perform this good reasoning. Patterns of reasoning are abstract. They 
need not be performed in order to be assessable as good or bad reasoning. It may be, 
however, that in order for the consideration that p to be a reason for a given subject to A, that 
subject must have some of the attitudes that constitute premise-responses of the good pattern 
of reasoning in virtue of which it is a reason. This would be a way for the view to allow that a 
subject’s attitudes may make a difference to her reasons.30 
 According to our account, reasons are premises of good reasoning from fitting 
responses. The motivation for this restriction is easy to see. Since beliefs are fitting only 
when true, this restriction ensures that only facts are reasons. It also allows us to avoid further 
difficulties. For example, suppose that someone were to reason in one of the following ways: 
 
  Belief that the moon orbits the earth 
and  Belief that the moon is made of cheese 
leads to  Belief that something made of cheese orbits the earth. 
  
  Intention to kill everyone 
and  Belief that the only way to kill everyone is to get a nuclear weapon  
leads to Intention to get a nuclear weapon.31 
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These pieces of reasoning instantiate good patterns. It’s just that the starting points are 
inappropriate. Without the restriction to fitting premise-responses, our account would entail 
that the fact that the moon orbits the earth is a reason to believe that something made of 
cheese orbits the earth, and it would entail that the consideration that the only way to kill 
everyone is to get a nuclear weapon is a reason to intend to get a nuclear weapon, at least for 
someone who intends to kill everyone. 
 By contrast, consider: 
 
  Belief that the moon orbits the earth 
and  Belief that the moon is made of rock  
leads to Belief that something made of rock orbits the earth. 
  
  Intention to prevent the madman from killing everyone 
and  Belief that the only way to do so is to disable his nuclear weapon  
leads to Intention to disable the madman’s nuclear weapon. 
 
These also look like good pieces of reasoning, but this time the starting points are fitting. Our 
account therefore entails, plausibly, that the fact that the moon orbits the earth is a reason to 
believe that something made of rock orbits the earth, and that the fact that the only way to 
prevent the madman from killing everyone is to disable his nuclear weapon is a reason to 
intend to disable his nuclear weapon, at least for someone who intends to foil the madman’s 
plan. 
 At this point, we should say something to clarify the ‘good’ in ‘good reasoning’. This 
looks like an attributive use of ‘good’. Our account of reasons as premises of good reasoning 
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therefore looks like an account of reasons in terms of attributive goodness – attributive 
goodness, like other goodness, being understood in turn in terms of fitting attitudes. 
 We don’t see any special problems with construing the view in this way. However, we 
do not wish to commit to the claim that attributive goodness is prior to reasons. An 
alternative is to understand the ‘good’ in ‘good reasoning’ simply as a placeholder for the 
coming account of when reasoning is going as it is supposed to. Then, reasons would be 
understood directly in terms of what it is for reasoning to go in this way. We now turn to 
providing this account.32  
 Our account begins from reflection on the point of reasoning. Reasoning is a way of 
revising our attitudes. But the point of reasoning is not merely to change our attitudes – for 
there are all sorts of ways we can do that. Plausibly, the point of reasoning – what in general 
makes it worth going in for – is to revise our attitudes so as to get things right. That is, the 
point is to add to our stock of fitting attitudes33 – for instance, to gain more true beliefs, or 
intentions for what is worth doing.34 Of course, reasoning cannot usually generate fitting 
attitudes from nothing – starting points matter. But if we start from fitting attitudes, we can 
expect good reasoning to lead us to further fitting attitudes, at least other things equal. This 
suggests the simple and prima facie plausible view that 
 
 For a pattern of reasoning to be good is for it to be fittingness-preserving, 
 
where 
 
For a pattern of reasoning to be fittingness-preserving is for it to be the case that if the 
premise-responses are fitting, then, other things equal, so is the conclusion-response. 
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This suggestion constitutes a generalisation of what seems a highly plausible theory of 
theoretical reasoning, namely the theory that good theoretical reasoning is truth-preserving 
reasoning. The ‘other things equal’ clause is required in order to allow for defeasible kinds of 
reasoning (and so for defeasible reasons). When a good but defeasible pattern of reasoning is 
defeated, other things aren’t equal. For example, consider: 
 
  Belief that Jennifer said that it is raining 
leads to Belief that it is raining. 
 
  Belief that I promised to meet my friend for lunch  
leads to Intention to meet my friend for lunch. 
 
These ways of reasoning may fail to lead from fitting premise-responses to a fitting-
conclusion response, for example because Jennifer is lying or because I can save someone’s 
life by missing lunch. But they nonetheless exemplify good pattern of reasoning. That’s 
because a situation in which testimony is unreliable, or in which I can save someone’s life by 
breaking a promise, is one in which other things are not equal.35 
 Though initially plausible, this suggestion faces problems. Consider the following 
examples: 
 
  Belief that grass is green 
leads to Belief that 79 is prime. 
 
  Belief that reliable Jane told me that Jill is admirable 
leads to Admiration of Jill.36 
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The reasoning in these examples is fittingness-preserving but it is not clear that it is good 
reasoning. And it is even less clear that the fact represented by the premise-belief, in these 
cases, constitutes a reason for the conclusion-response. So, having the property of being 
fittingness-preserving may not be sufficient for a pattern of reasoning to be good, and being a 
premise of a fittingness-preserving pattern of reasoning seems insufficient for being a reason. 
 We will therefore refine our account of good reasoning. In order to do so, we start 
from the observation that, when you perform a piece of reasoning that preserves fittingness, 
you may or may not be sensitive to its having this property. This is a familiar point. There is a 
difference between, for example, inferring a conclusion because it follows from your 
premises, and inferring the same conclusion from the same premises because you mistakenly 
think that anything follows from those premises. In the latter case, although the transition you 
make happens to be okay, something is still going wrong with your reasoning. Something is 
going wrong because you lack sensitivity to the appropriateness of the transition. 
 We can say that you are not reasoning competently, in the latter case. Here, we use the 
term ‘competence’ in a stipulative sense: you reason competently just in case your reasoning 
instantiates a fittingness-preserving pattern, and you perform it in a way that is sensitive to 
this. 
 Now, consider the first problematic example above. The problem with this reasoning 
is that the fact that grass is green is irrelevant to whether 79 is prime: although the transition 
is fittingness-preserving, this is just because it is necessarily true that 79 is prime. The 
premise could be anything at all. But this means that, in order to be sensitive to the 
fittingness-preserving character of the transition, you must already be aware that 79 is 
necessarily prime. So, you can’t come to believe that 79 is prime by competently performing 
this reasoning. In order to perform it competently, you would have to already believe this. 
19 
 
This, we suggest, is what prevents the pattern from counting as a good one. We 
therefore propose that 
  
For a pattern of reasoning to be good is for it to be the case that one can come to hold 
the conclusion-response by competent reasoning from the premise-responses. 
 
Here we are simply adding a condition to the account proposed earlier: good patterns are not 
only fittingness-preserving, but also such that one can be sensitive to this property in using 
them to add to one’s stock of attitudes. This is in the spirit of the earlier proposal. Patterns 
that can’t guide us in the acquisition of fitting attitudes are useless. 
This account relies on the notion of being sensitive to fittingness-preservation. The 
need for a distinction between making a transition that happens to be okay, and doing so in a 
way that is sensitive to its being okay, should be uncontroversial. Nonetheless, one might 
wonder what such sensitivity involves. The most straightforward way to understand 
sensitivity would be in causal terms: for your reasoning to be sensitive to fittingness-
preservation is for it to be appropriately caused by this property.37 Alternatively, it could be 
understood in terms of how you would reason in certain counterfactual circumstances, for 
example circumstances involving differences in the premise-responses. While we lack the 
space to develop these suggestions here, it is clear that neither of them need introduce 
circularity into our account by appealing to something normative other than fittingness. 
What about the transition from believing that reliable Jane told me that Jill is 
admirable to admiring Jill? To deal with this, we want to make a further distinction: between 
basic and complex patterns of reasoning. Once again, this is a distinction that any plausible 
view of reasoning must allow for. There is a difference between a direct transition from some 
set of attitudes to a further attitude—for example, a modus ponens transition—and an indirect 
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transition, in which several steps occur—for example, a transition consisting of several 
modus ponens steps. We can capture this distinction as follows: 
 
For a pattern of reasoning to be a good basic pattern is for it to be the case that one 
can come to hold the conclusion-response directly by competent reasoning from the 
premise-responses. 
 
To say that one can come to hold the conclusion-response directly is to say that there are no 
intermediary responses, such that they must be held on the basis of the premise-responses, 
and the conclusion-response held on the basis of the intermediary ones, in order for one to be 
reasoning competently. 
The transition from believing that reliable Jane told me that Jill is admirable to 
admiring Jill does not instantiate a good basic pattern. To be good reasoning, it must, 
implicitly at least, involve two steps: 
 
  Belief that reliable Jane told me that Jill is admirable 
leads to  Belief that Jill is admirable. 
 
  Belief that Jill is admirable 
leads to Admiration of Jill. 
 
After all, if I am not at least implicitly ‘passing through’ the belief that Jill is admirable—that 
is, if I don’t actually believe what Jane told me—then I am not sensitive to the fittingness-
preserving character of the transition from believing that Jane told me this to admiring Jill. 
 Now it is time for the slight modification, promised earlier, of our account of reasons: 
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For that p to be a reason for a response is for that p to be a premise of a good basic 
pattern of reasoning from fitting responses to that response. 
 
With this modification, we get the result that the fact that reliable Jane said that Jill is 
admirable is not itself a reason to admire Jill. The fact that Jill is admirable is such a reason. 
But this seems plausible, since it does not entail that this fact is a reason to admire her over 
and above the non-evaluative facts that make her admirable (we return to this issue below). 
 Is this modification ad hoc? We don’t think so. Given the distinction, which any 
plausible view of reasoning should allow, between basic and complex patterns of reasoning, 
our view faces the question of whether reasons correspond to all good patterns of reasoning, 
or just the basic ones. It seems legitimate for reflection on examples – such as the case of 
reliable Jane – to guide our answer to this question. Furthermore, to the extent that more 
theoretical pressures come to bear here, they seem to favour our restriction. Reasons for a 
response directly support that response, and they should be able to guide us through our 
sensitivity to that support. It is thus natural to think that reasons for a response must be such 
that you can competently reason from them directly to that response. It would be an odd sort 
of reason that, in reasoning directly from it to the response it supports, you were guaranteed 
to be reasoning incompetently. If a pattern is non-basic, however, it is not possible to 
competently reason directly from the premise-responses to the conclusion-response. The 
guidance role of reasons thus provides a principled motivation for the restriction to basic 
patterns.38 
  
Let us summarise the view we are proposing. What is good is what is fitting to value. 
Reasons are also explained in terms of fittingness. Reasons are premises of good patterns of 
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reasoning. That is, they are premises of fittingness-preserving patterns to which one can be 
sensitive. Thus, the basic normative unit is fittingness. We put fittingness first, and explain 
other normative properties in terms of fittingness together with certain other properties, such 
as those of the attitudes of valuing. 
 Of course, there is a great deal more to be said about the details of our fittingness-first 
view. In particular, the ‘other things equal’ clause and the notion of sensitivity to fittingness-
preservation call for further elaboration. But we hope to have done enough to suggest that 
there’s a promising view in the offing, and a legitimate rival to buck-passing. 
 
2.3 Fittingness First v. Buck-Passing 
 
Now that we have outlined an account of reasons in terms of fittingness, we are in a position 
to show how the fittingness-first view captures the third central attraction of buck-passing – 
its explanation of connections between reasons and value. 
The first connection between reasons and value that we considered was the linking 
principle, according to which respects in which X is good are reasons to value X. Our account 
seems to entail the linking principle. The transition from believing that X is F, where F is 
some respect in which X is good, to valuing X, constitutes good reasoning. For example, the 
transition from believing that the sculpture is elegant to admiring the sculpture preserves 
fittingness, and can be performed in a way that is sensitive to this fact. Thus the fact that the 
sculpture is elegant is a reason to admire it. 
What about Scanlon’s observation that the fact that something is good is not an 
additional reason to value that thing, over and above the non-evaluative facts which are 
reasons to value that thing? Our account allows that something’s being good is a reason to 
value it. But it also accommodates the observation that this isn’t a further reason to value the 
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thing – that is, a reason that adds any weight to the reasons provided by the non-evaluative 
facts. We take it that a reason R adds weight to a set of reasons S just when there is a possible 
opposing set of reasons O that is outweighed by R and S together, but not by S alone. On our 
view, this means it is good reasoning to move from R and S, together with O, to a response, 
whereas it is not good reasoning to move from S and O to that response.39 The goodness of 
something cannot in this way add weight to the non-evaluative reasons to value it. That’s 
because the total non-evaluative facts are sufficient for goodness – for it to be fitting to value 
the thing.40 So, the transition from belief in these facts to valuing the thing will be fittingness-
preserving. Adding the belief that the thing is good will be redundant – it will not yield a 
good pattern of reasoning that was not already available. 
 Thus, the fittingness-first view has all of the attractions of the buck-passing account 
but avoids the wrong kind of reason problem. And that’s not all. The fittingness-first view 
also offers some further attractions. We saw that buck-passers, in response to the wrong kind 
of reasons problem, sometimes try to draw a distinction between right-kind and wrong-kind 
reasons. Our account delivers a principled distinction of this sort. In particular, it entails that 
wrong-kind reasons aren’t reasons, and does so in a plausible way. The transition from 
believing that the demon threatened to destroy the world unless everyone values him to 
valuing the demon does not preserve fittingness. So the threat is not a reason to value the 
demon. However, it will be good reasoning to move from believing that the demon made this 
threat to wanting to value him, intending to bring it about that one values him, and so on. So 
the threat is, plausibly, a reason for these latter attitudes. Philosophers who have judged 
wrong-kind reasons to be reasons for the target attitudes have thus been misled by the fact 
that they are reasons for closely related attitudes. 
 This treatment of wrong-kind reasons is plausible, but it is not available to the buck-
passer. This is not to say that the buck-passer can’t claim that wrong-kind reasons aren’t 
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reasons. The point is, rather, that their account lacks the resources to justify and explain this 
claim. Insofar as buck-passers either give no account of what reasons are, or say merely that 
reasons are considerations which count in favour, there is nothing in their account to support 
the claim that putative wrong-kind reasons aren’t reasons. By contrast, an attractive 
explanation of why they are not falls directly out of our account. 
 Finally, our account explains more than the buck-passing account. It not only explains 
the connections between value and reasons, but also the connections between reasons and 
reasoning,41 and the connections between all of these things and fittingness. It explains why 
you can’t have reasons for things like headaches, which cannot be fitting and cannot be 
conclusions of reasoning. Relatedly, it explains the plausible response condition on reasons, 
mentioned earlier: if a consideration is such that you can’t respond to it by A-ing, then a 
fortiori you can’t competently reason from it to A-ing.42 So, on our account, such a 
consideration is not a reason to A. In addition, our account says what all good reasoning has 
in common, in a way that respects the plausible idea that truth-preserving deduction is a 
paradigm of it. 
 
3. Objections and Replies 
 
We have now outlined our fittingness-first view and argued that it shares all the attractions, 
and more, of the buck-passing view, while avoiding the central objection to buck-passing. In 
this section, we consider several objections to our view. 
 
3.1. What is Fittingness? 
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We are not the first to note that proponents of the fitting-attitudes account of value can avoid 
the wrong kind of reason problem by rejecting the buck-passer’s account of fittingness in 
terms of reasons. As Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen observe in their seminal discussion 
of the wrong kind of reason problem, Brentano and Ewing – the founding fathers of 
contemporary fitting-attitudes accounts – took fittingness as basic and would reject the claim 
that the evil demon’s threat makes it fitting to value him.43 Nonetheless, Rabinowicz and 
Rønnow-Rasmussen object to this proposal: 
 
[H]ow are we supposed to clarify this basic relation of fittingness? If we leave it as 
primitive, then FA analyses can be accused of reducing the concept of value to 
another notion that is at least as troublesome. On the other hand, if we try to explicate 
this relation, we seem to be drawn to something like this: a pro- or contra-attitude is 
fitting with regard to its object if and only if it is adequate to the value of that object. 
Thus, the analysis moves in a circle: from value to fittingness and from fittingness to 
value.44 
 
Our view avoids the second horn of this dilemma. We take fittingness as basic, rather than 
analysing it in terms of value. So our view is not circular. Presumably then, Rabinowicz and 
Rønnow-Rasmussen’s objection would be that we reduce value to something ‘at least as 
troublesome’. Now it is not entirely clear what they have in mind by this. But part of the 
worry seems to be that the notion of fittingness is obscure. If so, then, pending further 
clarification, it cannot help to shed light on value or, as we have suggested, on reasons. Thus 
understood, the objection takes the form of a challenge: can we say more about what 
fittingness is? 
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 This challenge has to be handled with some care. If the demand is for a reductive 
account of fittingness, then we’re not going to provide one, since we take fittingness to be 
normatively basic, and have no project to reduce the normative to the natural or descriptive 
(we are neutral on whether such a reduction is possible). However, a reductive account is not 
the only way to identify or characterise some phenomenon.  
 We can begin by reiterating that fittingness does seem to be a distinctive normative 
notion. The wrong kind of reason problem itself is evidence of this. It seems to be a common 
judgment that the demon’s threat provides reasons to value him but does not make it fitting to 
value him. Judgments about what you ought to do and what is permissible to do seem to go 
with reasons in these cases. If you think that the demon’s threat provides everyone with 
reason to value him, then surely you will also think that everyone ought, and so is permitted, 
to admire him. The wrong kind of reason problem shows that we can and do distinguish the 
notion of fittingness from other related notions. 
 It might be objected that this is so only because we think of ‘fittingness’ in terms of 
value – we think of ‘fitting’ as meaning ‘fitting to the value of the object’ (this seems to be 
what Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen have in mind above). But other versions of the 
wrong kind of reason problem show that this is not right. If an evil demon will kill you unless 
you believe that the moon is made of cheese, then it is tempting to think that this gives you 
reason to believe that the moon is made of cheese, but it does not make it fitting to believe 
this. But this cannot be because talk of fittingness is talk of what’s fitting to the value of an 
object. The object of a fitting belief need not be valuable.45 
 But even if it is granted that there is a distinctive ordinary notion of fittingness, why 
think that fittingness is normatively basic? Well, in part we think that this supposition should 
be judged by its fruits. To the extent that the picture of the normative and evaluative domain 
sketched in this paper is attractive, that is evidence that fittingness is first. But we can also 
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provide some further motivation by briefly considering three proposals for how fittingness 
might be reduced to something else. 
 The first proposal is that fittingness should be analysed in terms of reasons: what is 
fitting is what there is sufficient reason for. However, this proposal would face the same 
problem as the view that goodness should be understood in terms of reasons: the wrong kind 
of reason problem. This paper is motivated in large part by the challenges buck-passers face 
trying to solve this problem. We won’t reconsider these challenges here. 
 A second proposal is that fittingness is a matter of correct or accurate representation: 
an attitude is fitting if it correctly represents its object.46 This proposal works well for belief – 
beliefs are fitting when they correctly represent how things are. The problem is that the 
proposal accommodates the full range of attitudes that can be fitting only by making highly 
contentious assumptions about the nature of attitudes.47 It is clear that attitudes such as 
admiration, regret, hope, desire, and intention can be fitting. But it is not at all clear that these 
attitudes represent their objects in such a way that they are fitting just when their objects are 
as they are represented to be. Perhaps, for instance, envy represents another as having 
something desirable which you lack, desire represents its object as good, and intention 
represents an action as worthy of pursuit. If these assumptions hold then the proposal would 
have plausible implications about when these attitudes are fitting. But assumptions of this sort 
are a very big commitment for an account of fittingness to take on. It would be surprising if 
the possibility of assessing the fittingness of these attitudes turned on them. Furthermore, 
these assumptions would appear to rule out a fitting-attitudes account of value, by rendering 
it circular.48 
 A third proposal is that fittingness is a matter of permissibility: for it to be fitting to A 
is for it to be permissible to A.49 This proposal also has something going for it. Fittingness 
seems more like a permissive notion than a requiring one – you’re not required to believe 
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every truth, or value everything that’s valuable – and, like permissibility, it is an overall 
notion rather than a pro tanto one. Nonetheless, the view does not seem satisfactory. We have 
already seen some evidence for this. In wrong kind of reason scenarios, those who find it 
intuitive that there is reason to value the demon will also find it intuitive that it is permissible 
to value the demon. This suggests that we can distinguish our judgments about fittingness 
from our judgments about permissibility.50 
 There are also further grounds for taking there to be a distinction here. A distinction 
between fittingness and permissibility follows from what we have already argued, given the 
familiar idea that permissibility should be understood in terms of reasons: 
 
For it to be permissible for you to A is for you to have at least as weighty reason to A 
as to not A. 
 
We have argued that fittingness cannot be understood in terms of reasons. Thus, fittingness 
and permissibility are distinct.51 
 We take the above to go a fair way to meeting Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen’s 
challenge. There are good grounds for thinking that fittingness is distinct from other 
normative and evaluative notions and that it cannot easily be analysed in other terms. 
 So far in this section we have talked about what fittingness is not. Is there anything 
positive to be said about what it is? As we said in section 2.1 above, the fittingness of a 
response is a matter of the satisfaction a certain standard, internal to that response. One way 
of getting more of a grip on the sort of property fittingness is might be to say something about 
how a type of response gets to have a standard of fittingness. Here we offer a very speculative 
suggestion about how this might work. This suggestion is strictly an optional add-on; nothing 
in the main argument of the paper, or in the fittingness-first view as such, depends on it.52 
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 Let’s take the case of belief first. The belief that p is assessable as fitting or not 
depending on whether p is true or false. But what makes this the case? We suggest that this 
has to do with the constitutive functional role of belief, and in particular its role in reasoning. 
The belief that there is beer in the fridge, for example, might lead through some simple 
reasoning to the desire to go to the fridge, to the intention to get a glass, and so on. Crucially, 
the fittingness of these further responses will normally depend on whether the initial belief is 
true. Whether it is fitting to want to go to the fridge, or whether it is fitting to intend to get a 
glass, depends on whether there really is beer in the fridge. 
 So, belief by its nature tends to lead to certain further responses whose fittingness 
systematically depends on the content of the belief having a certain feature—namely, truth. 
We suggest that this is why belief has a standard of fittingness, and this is why the standard is 
truth.  
 A similar story, we suggest, can be told for other attitudes that have standards of 
fittingness. Consider desire. This attitude has a role in reasoning to further attitudes: the 
desire for some beer might lead you to intend to go to the fridge, to regret not finding beer 
there, and so on. Whether it is fitting to intend to go to the fridge, or to regret not finding beer 
there, depends on certain features of the prospect of drinking beer—whether it would be 
pleasant, whether it would be unhealthy, and so on. And these are just the sorts of features 
that, plausibly, contribute to the standard of fittingness for desire: something’s being pleasant 
tends to make it fitting to desire, whereas its being unhealthy tends to make it unfitting to 
desire. So, the features that make desire fitting are those on which depends the fittingness of 
the further responses that desire leads to.  
 While it is clear enough what feature makes a proposition fitting to believe, it is far 
from obvious which non-evaluative features make something desirable, or in what measure. 
But what we say above indicates how a given non-evaluative feature, such as that of being 
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pleasant, might get to be among those that make something desirable. Perhaps it would be 
possible to give an exhaustive account of these features, and of the contribution each makes 
to desirability, but such an account might be highly complex, and providing one would 
require substantive first-order normative theorising. The same is likely to be true for many 
other responses. 
 Generally, we suggest that something like the following is true. A response can get to 
have a standard of fittingness when that response, by its nature, leads through reasoning to 
further responses whose fittingness depends on the response’s content or object having 
certain features. This is not a reductive account of fittingness. What’s more, it takes for 
granted facts about what makes certain responses fitting in accounting for what makes other 
responses fitting.53 Nonetheless, we suggest it can still help us to understand the kind of 
property fittingness is. 
Note that this proposal helps to explain why it’s not fitting to admire the demon. 
Admiration of someone leads to further attitudes like taking pleasure in their achievements 
and desiring to emulate them. These attitudes would not be fitting when directed towards the 
demon. 
 Naturally, much more would need to be said to clarify and defend this speculative 
proposal. We offer it here merely as an optional suggestion for how fittingness might be 
elucidated in a non-reductive way.54 
 
3.2. The Wrong Kind of Fittingness? 
 
Here is a second objection to our account: 
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Even if fittingness is distinct from reasons, oughts, permissibility, and the like, the 
fittingness view has no real advantage over the buck-passing view. Just as the buck-
passing view faces the wrong kind of reason problem, the fittingness view faces the 
‘wrong kind of fittingness’ problem. For example, when the demon threatens to 
destroy the world unless you admire him, it would be prudentially fitting to admire 
the demon, even if it would not be fitting in the sense of satisfying admiration’s 
internal standard. The fittingness view must thus distinguish between these different 
fittingness properties. But this task looks no easier than the buck-passer’s wrong kind 
of reason problem. 
 
In order to assess this objection, it is helpful to recall how the WKR problem arises for the 
buck-passer. It starts with cases where there seem to be reasons for a pro-attitude, like 
admiring the demon, without the object of the attitude being thereby valuable. These cases 
appear to be counterexamples to the buck-passing account. Their force depends on the 
intuition that the demon’s threat (for example) really does give a reason to admire him. As we 
noted, many find this intuition compelling. And it can be bolstered by further considerations. 
It is often claimed that a reason for a response is just something that counts in favour of it; 
this approach, as we noted, is particularly natural for the buck-passer. The demon’s threat 
clearly counts in favour of admiring him. Furthermore, the ordinary notion of a reason 
includes the notion of a prudential reason. In so far as the demon’s threat makes it prudent to 
admire him, it seems to give a prudential reason to do so.  
 To deal with these apparent counterexamples, the buck-passer must either reject the 
intuition that the demon’s threat gives a reason to admire him, or refine her account by 
distinguishing between the right and wrong kind of reasons. Either way, as we explained, she 
acquires burdens. 
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To say that there is a ‘wrong kind of fittingness’ problem is to say that a 
corresponding line of reasoning applies with respect to fittingness. But in fact the 
corresponding line of reasoning fails at the first step. While it is intuitive that the demon’s 
threat gives a reason to admire him, it is not intuitive that the threat makes admiration of the 
demon fitting. As we noted earlier, this judgment is widely shared in the literature. And it 
coheres with intuitive judgments about similar cases: there’s little temptation to think that the 
need to ingratiate yourself with your boss makes her jokes worthy of amusement, or that 
Pascal’s wager makes belief in a god correct. Moreover, further considerations back it up. 
The notion of a response’s being fitting is not the same as the notion of something’s counting 
in favour of it. Nor does it have the notion of a prudential kind of fittingness built into it. So, 
in denying that it is fitting to admire the demon, we do not acquire a burden to defend and 
explain this verdict, in the way that the buck-passer who denies that there is a reason to 
admire the demon does. 
Of course, a full defence of our view should include some elucidation of fittingness 
that helps to vindicate and explain intuitive verdicts, such as that admiration of the demon is 
not fitting. We have offered some of this in sections 2.1 and 3.1.  
Perhaps the buck-passer’s options aren’t exhausted. As we explained, one move she 
can make is to distinguish between the right and wrong kind of reasons. The problem is then 
to explain this distinction without presupposing value. But the buck-passer might claim that 
she can put her view and ours back on all fours by taking the property of being a reason of 
the right kind as basic. Reasons of the wrong kind may then be understood in terms of right-
kind reasons – for instance, perhaps wrong kind reasons are just right-kind reasons to favour 
an attitude.55 The distinction between the right and wrong kind of reasons does after all have 
some intuitive purchase, and it’s clear enough that the demon’s threat falls on the wrong side. 
This buck-passer thus avoids a counterintuitive verdict about the demon case, and, while she 
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does appeal to a normative notion that is taken as basic, this is no disadvantage compared to 
our view, which does the same. 
The problem with this suggestion is that it’s hard to see how the property of being a 
reason of the right kind could be normatively basic. The obvious way to understand this 
property is conjunctively: being a right-kind reason is being a reason, plus meeting some 
further condition. But so understood, the property of being a reason must be prior to that of 
being a reason of the right kind.56 By contrast, fittingness does not seem to be a matter of 
having some normative property plus meeting some further condition. It is thus a more 
plausible candidate for being normatively basic. 
Where does this leave ‘prudential fittingness’? This seems to be just another term for 
‘prudence’. We do not deny that prudence is a standard of evaluation that can be applied to 
attitudes and other responses. But not all standards are standards of fittingness. We have no 
difficulty in distinguishing between fittingness and other standards of evaluation, as the 
widely shared judgments noted above illustrate.57 Of course, for any arbitrary standard of 
evaluation, we could call things that meet that standard ‘fitting’ with respect to it, but this 
wouldn’t create a philosophical problem of distinguishing this kind of ‘fittingness’ from the 
property we have been talking about here - a distinct, normative property, familiar in ordinary 
thought. 
 
3.3. Pro Tanto Goodness 
 
Here is a third objection: 
 
According to the fitting-attitudes account, something is good if it is fitting to value it. 
But this is not always so. An outcome may be good in some respect even if, because it 
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is very bad in other ways, it is not fitting to value that outcome. For example, consider 
an outcome in which cats live happy lives while all humans spend their lives in agony. 
This outcome is good in one respect – the cats are happy. But it is not fitting to value 
it – for instance, to wish that this outcome obtained, or to hope to bring it about – 
because there is so much suffering in it.58 
 
This objection may seem to favour the buck-passing account over the fitting-attitudes 
account. On the buck-passing view, we can say that this outcome is good in one respect, 
because the fact that the cats are happy is a reason to value this outcome. Since this does not 
entail that it is fitting to value the outcome, this does not seem implausible. More generally, it 
seems an attraction of buck-passing that it understands pro tanto goodness (goodness in some 
respect) in terms of pro tanto reasons. Conversely, the problem for the fitting-attitudes 
account seems to be that, since it is fitting to value an outcome only if it is good overall, the 
fitting-attitudes account cannot give an account of pro tanto goodness. 
 We believe that this objection can be met. To do so, we need to distinguish between 
pro tanto and overall pro-attitudes. A pro tanto pro-attitude is an attitude towards something 
in some respect. An overall pro-attitude is an attitude towards something overall. These 
things can come apart. Thus I might admire someone in respect of their courage and 
ingenuity, while disapproving of the use they put these traits to and so not admiring them 
overall. 
 Given this distinction, it is natural to understand pro tanto goodness in terms of the 
fittingness of pro tanto pro-attitudes. We can say that for X to be good in respect R is for it to 
be fitting to value X in respect R. In the example above, it is not fitting to value the outcome 
in which everyone suffers but some cats are happy overall. But it is fitting to value it in 
respect of the cats’ happiness. For instance, if you knew of such an outcome it would be 
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fitting to be glad of it insofar as the cats are happy, while being sorry overall. This 
implication of the account does not seem implausible.  
 This account of pro tanto value also helps us to answer an objection to fittingness-first 
views due to Mark Schroeder. Schroeder claims that there are grounds for thinking that 
fittingness is to be understood in terms of reasons which parallel the grounds for thinking that 
‘ought’ is to be understood in terms of reasons. We should think ‘ought’ is to be understood 
in terms of reasons because this explains why what you ought to do is affected by the way in 
which competing reasons weigh up. For instance, you ought to keep your promise to meet 
your friend if this means missing your favourite TV show but not if it means leaving someone 
to die. Examples like this suggest that what you ought to do is determined by the balance of 
reasons. Schroeder suggests that, in a similar way, what is fitting is determined by the balance 
of competing considerations: 
 
If Mary is more steadfast than Claire, then other things being equal – if that is the only 
relevant consideration in play – she is also more admirable – that is, it is fitting to 
admire her more. But if Claire is far more accomplished than Mary, then it may be 
that Claire is more admirable than Mary – that is, it may be that it is fitting to admire 
Claire more. The fact that Mary is more steadfast than Claire is a reason to admire her 
more, and the fact that Claire is far more accomplished is a reason to admire her more. 
Which one it is fitting to admire more is affected by each of these reasons, and by 
their relative weights. Finally, we should understand claims of fittingness to be claims 
about the balance of (the right kind of) reasons, precisely because that best explains 
why their truth is affected in the way that it is by the balance of (the right kind of) 
reasons.59 
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However, given what we have said about pro tanto value properties, we can offer a different 
explanation of the way in which claims of fittingness are determined by competing 
considerations. On our view, the fittingness of valuing something overall will be determined 
by the fittingness of valuing it in certain respects. In Schroeder’s example, it is fitting to 
admire Mary in respect of her steadfastness and fitting to admire Claire in respect of her 
accomplishments. Furthermore, valuing attitudes come in degrees – it will be fitting to 
admire Claire to a certain degree in respect of her accomplishments and fitting to admire 
Mary to a certain degree in respect of her steadfastness. This observation allows us to give a 
simple account of how the fittingness of admiring one more than the other is determined by 
the fittingness of admiring each in certain respects. It will be fitting to admire Claire overall 
more than Mary if it is fitting to admire Claire to a greater degree in respect of her 
accomplishments than it is to admire Mary in respect of her steadfastness. While this 
explanation of how fittingness can be determined by competing considerations is somewhat 
schematic, it seems no more so than the alternative Schroeder offers.60  
 
3.4. Overkill? 
 
Here is a fourth objection: 
 
The fittingness-first view is overkill. The view of reasons that you defend – that 
reasons are premises of good reasoning – implies that putative wrong kind of reasons 
are not reasons. Buck-passers can thus defend their view just by accepting this 
account of reasons. There is no need to give up the buck-passing account or accept 
that fittingness is basic. 
 
37 
 
The problem with this objection is that the view it outlines looks both circular and 
implausible. On the view outlined, value and fittingness are understood in terms of reasons, 
and reasons are understood in terms of good reasoning. Such a view looks circular because 
the view that reasons are premises of good reasoning makes reference to fittingness: 
 
For that p to be a reason for a response is for that p to be a premise of a good basic 
pattern of reasoning from fitting responses to that response. 
 
As we saw, this reference to fittingness is necessary – without it the view has implausible 
consequences. But if fittingness is understood in terms of reasons, rather than taken as basic, 
then this account of reasons is circular. 
 The view looks implausible because it takes the basic normative unit to be that of a 
good pattern of reasoning. But good patterns of reasoning do not look like good candidates to 
be the basic normative unit. It is plausible that the point of reasoning is to take us somewhere 
worth going – for instance, to expand what we know, come to intend what is worth doing, or, 
as we would say, to lead us to fitting responses. And if this is the point of reasoning, it seems 
very plausible that good patterns of reasoning should be understood as patterns which serve 
this aim. If good reasoning is in this way instrumental, it is hard to see how good patterns of 
reasoning could ground of all normativity.  
 We thus take it that there are ample grounds for preferring the fittingness first view to 
the version of the buck-passing account this objection suggests. 
 
4. Conclusion 
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Buck-passing, despite its attractions, faces the wrong kind of reason problem. The fittingness-
first view does not face this problem. As we saw, the problem arises when the fitting-attitudes 
account of value is supplemented with an account of fittingness in terms of reasons. The 
fittingness-first view does not take this step. But as we have also seen, the fittingness-first 
view also has all the attractions, and more, of the buck-passing account. We thus take there to 
be a strong case for proponents of fitting-attitudes accounts to accept the fittingness-first 
view, rather than the buck-passing account. 
 Of course, much remains to be done for a full vindication of the fittingness-first view. 
While we have presented several ways in which we take the fitting-attitudes account, and the 
other elements of our view, to be attractive, we have not developed these suggestions into full 
arguments for the view, and we have left many promissory notes along the way. For example, 
a full defence of a fitting-attitudes account would need to do much more to show that the 
account of goodness simpliciter can be satisfactorily developed into an account of goodness-
for and attributive goodness. Our account of reasons is also little more than an outline – a full 
defence would require us to say much more about the crucial ‘other things equal’ clause in 
the account of good reasoning, and about what it is to be sensitive to fittingness-preservation. 
Finally, of course, there is more that might be said about the central notion of fittingness; in 
particular our tentative suggestion that attitudes might come to have standards of fittingness 
in virtue of their functional role requires further development. These omissions 
notwithstanding, we hope to have done enough to show the attractions of taking fittingness 
first, and thus to have made these remaining questions look worth pursuing. 
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 Note that what we say here, combined with the linking principle and the account of the weights of 
reasons mentioned in n. 39, can also explain why, as Schroeder says, the fittingness of admiring Claire more 
than Mary is affected by the reasons to admire them, and by the weights of those reasons. 
